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Cooperation and diversity. An evolutionary approach 
 
Luigino Bruni and Alessandra Smerilli1 
In this paper we propose a pluralistic and multi-dimensional approach to 
cooperation. Specifically, we seek to show that, in certain settings, less 
unconditional forms of  cooperation may be combined with more gratuitous ones. 
Starting with the prisoner’s dilemma game, the evolution of cooperation is analyzed 
in the presence of different strategies, which represent the heterogeneity of the forms 
of cooperation in civil life. 
There are many behaviour patterns, though not all of them are based on self-interest 
and conditionality. The dynamics of cooperation are studied through the use of 
evolutionary games applied in contexts that are either one-shot or repetitive. One of 
the most important results of the paper is the conclusion that cooperation is favoured 
by heterogeneity. 
 
JEL Classification: C72, C 73, D64 
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1. Introduction 
 
Civil life is essentially cooperation. Neoclassical economics offers a highly 
parsimonious view of cooperation based on individual self-interests and 
instrumental rationality. In such a vision of cooperation an agent, for instance, 
would never cooperate in a non-iterated prisoner’s dilemma game. If instead the 
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game is repeated, the traditional theory justifies the cooperation  by evoking self-
interest (this being the so-called ‘folk theorem’) or enforcement. 
   In reaction to this excessively parsimonious view of cooperation, recent years have 
seen development of a body of literature, the so-called‘social preferences’ theories, 
which instead seeks to explain why even in a one-shot non-cooperative game (i.e. 
the ‘ultimatum’ or ‘trust game’) it may be rational to play ‘cooperatively’. The 
explanation, of which there are several variants, is a redefinition of the utility 
function of the agents, by introducing non material payoffs associated to norms such 
as inequality aversion or reciprocity, . In this way it is possible to explain the 
emergence of cooperative behaviour in contexts where the standard theory would 
exclude it. 
   This is the explanation of cooperation advanced by behavioural economists (see 
Gintis (2004) and Bowles and Gintis (2004)), who base their analyses of cooperation 
on the theory of strong reciprocity (Fehr and Gächter (2000)). By ‘strong 
reciprocity’ they mean a social norm which, in a manner costly to the individual, 
rewards those who behave well and punishes those who behave badly. This theory 
of cooperation stands in methodological and cultural opposition to the mainstream 
economic theory: whereas standard economics (i.e. that of Binmore, 2005) 
envisages nothing but self-interest and monetary incentives, strong reciprocity 
theory explains the emergence of cooperation on the basis of a form of altruism 
which does not even require the game’s repetition. 
   In this paper we adopt a different perspective for explaining the emergence of 
cooperation. We propose a theory of cooperation which is less parsimonious than 
that of standard economics, but without embracing the strong reciprocity thesis. We 
put forward a pluralistic and multidimensional view of cooperation and 
consequently examine aspects hitherto insufficiently explored by economic and 
social theory. In particular, the intuition inspiring this essay is the multidimensional 
nature of cooperation, that is, at the same time, one and many; civil society 
flourishes if and when the different forms of cooperation are seen as complementary 
instead of competitive or substitute one another. In this sense,diversity fosters 
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cooperation, as it is well know in biology. Specifically, we seek to show on the one 
hand that, in certain settings, less ‘altruistic’ or unconditional forms of  cooperation 
may combine with more gratuitous ones and so foster a culture of generalized 
cooperation. On the other, too many unconditional actions will end to promote the 
non-cooperation.  
   We accordingly construct dynamic models which will enable us to analyse diverse 
patterns of cooperation. There are many such patterns, not all of them based on self-
interest, but all of them important for understanding the dynamics of civil life. 
   We shall base our analysis on the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game, because it lends 
itself well to the modelling of ‘difficult’ cooperation: the kind that occurs in 
situations where there is no enforcement and where there is always an incentive for 
non-cooperation. We believe that these situations are frequent and relevant – 
although in civil society individuals play many games, not only the PD – and that 
they are important in the real dynamics of cooperation in civil life. 
   In section 2 we analyse the evolution of cooperation in a ‘one-shot’ context, while 
in section 3 we apply the evolutionary analysis to repeated games. In section 4 we 
concentrate on analysis of situations in which four strategies interact, also furnishing 
simulations. The paper concludes with a brief discussion on the results of our 
analysis. 
 
2. Evolution in a one-shot game 
2.1. The basic model: two strategies 
 
The pay-off matrix of the game is the following.2 
 
 C D 
C ȕ- Ȗ - Ȗ 
D Ǻ 0 
                                                 
2 The table represents a particular case which simplifies the analysis without compromising the 
results. As well known, for a game to be a Prisoner’s Dilemma, the payoff order must be ȕ > Ȗ > 0.    
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   It can be easily shown that both players will choose not to cooperate or defect (D) 
in a one-shot game, and that the outcome (0,0) will be a Nash equilibrium. In this 
kind of  non-iterated game cooperation cannot arise unless errors are committed or 
the players behave irrationally. 
   The structure of our model is as follows. Time is continuous. We suppose that 
there is a continuum of agents belonging to a particular population, and that they 
must choose one of the J pure strategies ^ `J,...,1  whenever they interact with other 
subjects in the same population. The subjects are distributed among I sub-
populations ^ `I,...,1 , which are assigned exogenously in the sense that existing sub-
populations may disappear but new ones cannot be created. 
   The model’s dynamic is described by standard ‘replication’ equations. The 
replication dynamic is widely used in evolutionary models, which assume that the 
most profitable strategies proliferate in the population at the expense of others. 
Heckathorn (1996) describes this dynamic well: 
“Based on the resulting payoffs, the actors with the most successful strategies 
proliferate at the expense of the less successful. This process is then repeated, 
generation after generation, until the system either approaches stable equilibrium or 
cyclical variation.” (p. 261) 
 
   This dynamics is usually employed in biology to study the evolution of species on 
the basis of the relative fitness. However, in social sciences there is a different 
interpretation of such a selection process: it involves learning by observing and 
imitating the behaviour of others. In what follows, we adopt neither the biological 
analogy nor the memetic one (i.e. the extension of gene-based biological evolution 
to meme-based social evolution). Instead, we use the concept of ‘expected utility’ as 
an indicator of the success (not necessarily material) of a strategy: a success which, 
over time, is imitated by less successful strategies (those with less expected utility).    
The dynamic of the model can be represented by the replication equations: 
 
NiYYpp iii ,...,1      )(      [1] 
5 
 
where p denotes the proportion of subjects for each subpopulation, Y the average 
payoff, and Yi the average payoff for a subject belonging to the subpopulation i. 
   The dynamic is defined on the invariant simplex: 
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   We shall use this analytical structure to analyse the evolutionary process that 
arises in a situation where there are two pure strategies, C and D, and first two, then 
three, and finally four subpopulations. 
 
To begin, we assume that in a one-shot game there are only two types of agents: 
those who always defects (types N), and those who instead always cooperate (types 
G, where G means gratuitous). In each round, a player is randomly paired with 
another player (‘random matching’), with whom s/he plays once, after which there is 
another random encounter.3 In a situation such as this, it can be easily shown that G 
subjects will be invaded by the N, that is an evolutionary stable strategy.  
 
2.2. Three strategies with recognizability 
We now introduce a third type, which adds to the previous ones: the T type (from 
tit-for-tat4). ‘Cooperate’ is not the T type’s dominant strategy; but on encountering 
and recognizing a G type, s/he does not exploit G but prefers to cooperate. The T 
type’s decision to cooperate is conditioned by the ‘assurance’ (to use Sugden’s 
[2003] term) that the adversary too will cooperate. 
   What does the dynamic analysis tell us in this situation? Two cases should be 
distinguished: if the T type recognizes the other players, s/he has a perfect signal 
                                                 
3 The game will always be non-repeated, because even if the players meet again in the future they 
will not recognize each other.  
4 See Axelrod (1984), Sugden (2004). 
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with which to discriminate between N and G types, so that the cooperative solution 
is sustainable in the long period. Instead, if T does not have a perfect signal, and 
may therefore commit errors, thereby being at risk of cooperating with N types and 
of not cooperating with other T types and with G types, the results are different: 
according to the value of the payoffs and to the probability of error, there may arise 
a non-cooperation equilibrium or the survival of only T types, with G types destined 
for ‘extinction’. 
   We begin with the simpler case in which the T type is assumed to receive a perfect 
signal. 
   The hypotheses are therefore that: 
a. there exist three types: Ns (who always play D), Gs (who always play C), and Ts 
(who play C with those that they identify as Gs or Ts, and D with Ns); the payoffs 
are those set out in table 1; 
b. the probability of encountering a type i is pi, i = N,G,T, and pt = 1 – pn – pg; 
c. the expected utilities are therefore: 
Un = pn(0) +  pg(ȕ) + pt(0) 
Ug = pn(- Ȗ) +  pg(ȕ - Ȗ) + pt(ȕ - Ȗ) 
Ut = pn(0) +  pg(ȕ - Ȗ) + pt(ȕ - Ȗ) 
 
The payoffs can be arranged in a matrix, which we call A: 
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The system’s dynamic can be written as follows: 
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where    tgnt ppp ,,p {  and   3,2,1 with   lAp l  is the l-th component of the vector 
Ap and therefore corresponds to the expected payoff (as in hypothesis e.), while 
tpAp is the average payoff. 
   The space of the dynamic is the simplex: 
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   For the dynamic analysis we draw on Bomze (1983) on the replication dynamic: 
the analytical procedure is set out in the Appendix. 
   It is easy to show that only G types and T types will survive in time, while N types 
will become extinct: this is a well known result. Consider the simplex in Figure 1: 
the side on which pn=0 (i.e. only Gs and Ts exist) consists entirely of fixed points. 
The presence of T types therefore means that the equilibrium may settle at 
cooperation. The most interesting result is that the final proportion of G types will 
be greater, the smaller their proportion at the beginning of the game. On following 
the trajectories within the simplex, in fact, we find that those starting from a point 
where the proportion is high finish at a point where the final proportion is low. The 
explanation for this is straightforward: G types are ‘preyed upon’ by the Ns, so that 
the larger their number at the beginning, the more nutritious the Ns’ ‘diet’ will be. 
Instead, if there are only a few G types at the beginning, the Ns will have scant prey 
and will succumb (because they cannot prevail over the T types).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
   G types – the unconditional cooperators – can survive and assert themselves over 
time is there exists a mechanism (in this case the perfect signal utilized by T types) 
with which N types can be recognized. 
   We shall now see what happens if the hypothesis of perfect recognizability is 
abandoned. 
N 
T 
G 
Figure 1  
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 2.3. Imperfect recognizability 
  If the T type does not have a perfect signal, the situation becomes more 
complicated. Let us assume a probability r that the T type is mistaken in identifying 
the type with which s/he is dealing. 
   Hence, if a T type is matched with an N type, s/he will play N with probability r 
and C with probability (l – r); if instead s/he is matched with a G type s/he will play 
C with probability r and D with probability (1 – r), and so on. 
   We therefore introduce a new hypothesis (d) in place of hypothesis c. 
 
Hypothesis d. The expected utilities of the three types are 
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   We alter matrix A for the dynamic analysis, while everything else remains the 
same as before. 
   As said, in a situation of this kind, N types or T types will survive over time if the 
probability that T types will recognize the other players is relatively high; whereas if 
this probability is low the T types will become extinct as well, so that nothing 
changes with respect to a situation in which only N types and G types are present. 
   As shown by figures 2a and 2b, G types are anyway destined for extinction, 
though matters are different for N types and T types. If the probability is low, all the 
trajectories simply converge on a situation in which only N types survive. If the 
probability is high, the final outcome depends on the initial situation. In other words, 
in the lower part of the figure (which, according to how the simplex is constructed, 
signifies relatively many Ns, many Gs and few Ts), Ns will prevail over both the Gs 
and the Ts. In the upper part, where there are initially more Ts and fewer Ns, Ts will 
prevail. The G types will always become extinct, even in a world where N types do 
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not exist, because of the possibility that the T types will fail to recognize them. For 
if T types do not recognize G types, they will not cooperate with them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proposition 1. If hypotheses a, b and d hold, and if the T types recognize with 
probability r the types with which they play, then only N types will survive over time 
if JE
E
 2r . 
N types or T types are able to survive if JE
E

t
2
r .   
 
   Probability r therefore depends on the ratio between the utility obtained by not 
cooperating at the expense of those who cooperate, and the utility of those who 
cooperate with those who do likewise. The threshold value of r (the minimum value 
for T types to be able to survive over time) is lower, the smaller the value of Ȗ: that 
is, the smaller the ‘exploitation advantage’ or the ‘cost of coherence’. In the second 
example, 2b, the possible equilibrium depends, other conditions remaining equal, on 
Figure 2. Case 2a: JE
E
 2r , case 2b: JE
E

t
2
r  
N 
T 
G N 
T 
G 
f 
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the position of the fixed point f.  It can be shown, in fact, that if r tends to its 
minimum value, i.e. JE
E
o 2r , the point tends to shift towards the vertex T.
5 This 
means that as r diminishes, the equilibrium of only Ns becomes more likely (all the 
trajectories in the simplex starting from a point situated lower than f lead to N). 
   A similar result has been obtained by Bowles and Gintis (2004). In their model, 
however, three different types interact: the selfish type, the unconditional 
cooperator, and the reciprocator, who punishes the selfish type at his/her own 
expense if recognizing him/her. With the base version of their model Bowles and 
Gintis obtain the survival, at asymptotic level, of only selfish types. Then by varying 
the parameters and using simulations, they obtain high levels of cooperation. 
 
3. The dynamic game 
 
   We saw in the previous section that G types had little hope of surviving in the 
evolutionary context described. 
   We now see what happens if the game is repeated. We assume, that is to say, that 
associated with every random encounter is a repeated interaction with the same 
person. This interaction may be of greater or lesser duration according to a 
parameter, ʌ, which denotes the probability that the game will continue for another 
round6. After a series of interactions with the same person, another random 
encounter occurs, and the (repeated) game resumes with another (randomly 
matched7) partner.  
                                                 
5 The coordinates of point f are ¸¸¹
·
¨¨©
§



{
rrr
r
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EJE
22
)1(,0,
22
2 , and as r tends to 
its minimum value, the former coordinate (pn) tends to 0. 
6 We are hence in a context of indefinitely repeated game. 
7 We adopt the simplifying hypotheses that the repeated game finishes for all players at the same 
moment, but the results do not change if the game finishes earlier for one of them, because s/he is re-
assigned to another game. 
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   We are well aware that if the game is repeated, the possible strategies are infinite. 
We consequently restrict our analysis to four strategies, differentiating the T strategy 
(of the previous section) into two strategies, which we shall call (following Sugden 
2004) B (= Brave) and C (= Cautious). B and C strategies are a kind of trigger 
strategies: they stop to cooperate if they see the other player defecting. 
    The strategies considered are therefore the following: 
1. N: never cooperate. N is a highly important strategy because analysis of 
cooperation dynamics becomes non-banal precisely when non-cooperation scenarios 
are possible. 
2. G: always cooperate. 
3. C: cooperate with a player who cooperated in the previous round; do not 
cooperate with a player who did not cooperate in the previous round, and begin by 
not cooperating. If these cautious types are to cooperate, they must have obtained 
cooperation in the previous round. When Cs encounter other Cs or Ns, they never 
cooperate. An immediate consequence ensues: in a world with only Cs and Ns, 
cooperation will never be possible, and it will not be possible to distinguish Cs from 
Ns because they behave in exactly the same way.  
4. B: this strategy has the same structure as C, the only difference being that B 
begins by cooperating. B stands for ‘Brave’, in fact. Bs are players who begin by 
cooperating (and therefore risk being ‘exploited’ by Ns or Cs in the first round). But 
if in the second round they do not receive cooperation, nor will they cooperate. 
 
   If we use cgbn pppp ,,,  to denote the probabilities of encountering, respectively, 
an N, B, G or C type, the expected utilities in a world with these four possible 
strategies are: 
 
)0(
1
)0( cgbnn ppppU  S
EE   [3]  
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   An N type will never cooperate with other N types and with C types who begin by 
not cooperating and do not cooperate if the other player did not cooperate in the first 
round, whence )0(np , )0(cp . If  the N type encounters a B type, s/he will obtain ȕ 
in the first round because B began with an act of cooperation, but the subsequent 
payoffs will be equal to 0 because B will stop cooperating from the second round 
onwards. Finally, if N encounters a G, s/he will obtain ȕ in every round8 because G 
will always cooperate. 
 ESJS
JE
S
JEJ 



 cgbnb ppppU 1
)(
1
)()(   [4] 
   The B type begins with an act of cooperation and continues to cooperate if the 
adversary in the first round has responded by cooperating. Cooperation is assured 
with other B types and with G types, but not with N types, or even with C types.9  
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  A G type will therefore always cooperate with Bs and with Gs, and with Cs from 
the second round onwards, while Gs will let themselves be ‘exploited’ by Ns. 
  )0(
1
)0( cgbnc ppppU ¸¹
·¨
©
§ 
 JS
JEJSE   [6] 
   Finally, a C type will not cooperate with Ns and Cs, and s/he will cooperate with 
Gs from the second round onwards. With Bs, C types will receive ȕ in the first 
round, given that Bs begins with an act of cooperation, and (- Ȗ) in the second round. 
From the third round onwards Cs will obtain 0.  
 
       
                                                 
8 The expected utility associated to this interaction is hence ...2  ESESE , and then S
E
1
. 
9 The payoff  ESJ cp depends on the fact that B cooperates the first time and C responds by 
not cooperating; B will therefore have (- Ȗ), but C will cooperate in the second round, because B has 
cooperated in the first. From the third round onwards the payoff will be 0. 
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3.1. Evolutionary analysis 
 
In order to analyse the evolution in dynamic terms, we consider three strategies at a 
time (so that we can use simplexes). 
   After the first game, it is likely that the proportion of players adopting the winning 
strategy will increase in future pairings: that is, the winning strategy will be imitated 
by others. This will be the basis for our both repeated and evolutionary analysis.     
   It will be assumed in the analysis that E
JS ! .10 
 
3.1.1. First case: N, C, G 
 
   We begin the analysis with B types omitted. 
   The replication dynamic can be represented with the following simplex: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
                                                 
10 We imagine, in fact, that two players agree to cooperate in each round. If they abide by the 
agreement, the expected utility of each player is S
JE


1
. However, if one of the players breaks the 
agreement, the other will no longer cooperate. Thus a player who breaks the agreement in the first 
round will receive ȕ, but from the second round onwards s(/he will always receive 0. The condition 
for cooperation agreements (without enforcement) to come about is: ES
JE !


1
, and hence E
JS ! . 
On this see also Sugden (2004)   
N C 
G 
g 
 
Figure 3 
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When strategies N, C and G are present, the outcome may be one of the multiple 
fixed points along the line NC, which signifies non-cooperation. If only strategies G 
and C are present, the outcome may be a unique combination of C and G that 
depends on the position of the point (in this case a saddle point), g, i.e.: 
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)1(,0g . 
   Other conditions remaining equal, if 1oS  – so that the likelihood of continuing 
with the same person initially encountered is very high – the point shifts towards 
vertex G. 
   This result strikes us as important: only G types are able somehow to activate Cs, 
who without Gs would always be confined to a world of non-cooperation. 
   The following proposition therefore holds: 
 
Proposition 2. In a world in which the types or strategies N, G, C are present, the 
replication dynamic has two different outcomes: a combination of C and G (fixed 
point g) only if pn is equal to 0, or a combination along the line of fixed points N, C 
(and consequently non-cooperation). 
   Without the presence of B types – who always begin with an act of cooperation – 
it is unlikely that virtuous cooperation mechanisms will be triggered. 
 
3.1.2. Second case: N, B, C 
 
   Another interesting case is that in which G types are absent. Here too, non-
cooperation is a probable equilibrium. The other equilibrium is the one where only B 
strategies survive. In a three-strategy world in which only Ns, Cs and Bs are present, 
in fact, Ns and Cs will never cooperate, and moreover the Ns will have no Gs to 
exploit. Instead, the Bs will cooperate only and exclusively with each other, 
obtaining a greater payoff –  if the game lasts for a long time – than that received by 
the Ns and the Cs. 
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   Here too, as shown by figure 4, the possible long-period equilibrium depends on 
the coordinates of the fixed point f.  
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 All the points of departure in the simplex lying below the trajectory from C to f will 
evolve towards a non-cooperative equilibrium if N and C are present. 
 
Proposition 3.  In a world in which the types or strategies N, C, B are present, the 
replication dynamic has two different outcomes: the survival of B strategies alone, 
or a combination along the line of fixed points N, C (and consequently non-
cooperation). 
   The coordinates of point f are now: 
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   It is evident that if 1oS , the point tends to shift towards the N vertex, so that 
that greater the probability of the game continuing, the more likely it becomes that 
Bs will prevail and that the cooperative outcome will occur. In a world without G 
types, Cs do not begin to cooperate. We may say that the sacrifice of the Gs 
somehow restores cooperation potential to Cs, for without their presence the only 
possible form of cooperation is that between B types. To be noted is that B types 
N C 
B 
f
Figure 4 
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begin with an act of cooperation. In their absence, a non-cooperative equilibrium 
would arise. 
 
3.1.3. Third case: N, B, G 
 
   The simplex relative to this third and final case shows that, depending on the point 
of departure and the position of fixed point f on the side NB, there will be a different 
final equilibrium, which may be a combination of G and B, or a world consisting 
only of Ns. Matters are different when the three types instead coexist in the 
population at time 1 (when the dynamic begins). In this case, non-reciprocity, i.e. an 
equilibrium consisting of only N types, may prevail. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proposition 4. In a world in which the strategies N, B, G are present, two equilibria 
are possible: the survival of only types N and a coexistence of B types and G types 
along the line of fixed points on the B-G side. Which of the two equilibria will come 
about depends on the position of the fixed point f along the N-B side. 
 
   As the simplex is constructed here, considering that the position of N in terms of 
fraction of the population is (1.0.0) and the position of B is (0,1,0), the fixed point f 
has the following coordinates: 
N B 
G 
f 
Figure 5 
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The position of point f therefore depends on ȕ and Ȗ, and on the value of ʌ. In 
particular, for E
JS o , point f will approach B. If instead 1oS , point f will shift 
towards N. With a small value of ʌ, ceteris paribus, the likelihood that only N types 
will prevail is very high; instead, with a very high ʌ, it very likely that the final 
equilibrium will be the one in which B types and G types coexist. 
   For every intermediate value between the two extremes, the final equilibrium will 
depend on the point of departure: if this is a point to the left of the trajectory leading 
from side B-G to point f, then the tendency is an equilibrium of only Ns; vice versa, 
if the point of departure is to the right of the trajectory, the outcome will be a 
coexistence of Bs and Gs. Note that points to the left are characterized, amongst 
other things, by a lower percentage of Bs than of Gs. It is therefore important that B 
types be relatively more than Gs and Ns for the B-G equilibrium to come about. In 
short, evident here is the delicate role of G strategies: if there are too many of them, 
they foster the emergence of N types over Bs. Metaphors aside, in a population 
where non-cooperation is possible, if there are too many unconditional acts, not only 
are they likely to become extinct, but they will also extinguish the possibility of 
cooperation, for an equilibrium consisting of non-generalized cooperation. 
   At the same time, the coordinates of point f also depend on ȕ and Ȗ. The value of Ȗ 
is the one which most clearly tells us what the social rewards structure is. A high Ȗ 
denotes a culture which penalizes reciprocity, while a high (ȕ-Ȗ) denotes a culture 
which rewards it. In fact, if the first coordinate is high, point f tends to N (the same 
happens if the second coordinate is low), while if it is low f tends to B.  
This is because the coordinate of N is directly proportional to ȕ: while both 
coordinates depend on (ȕ-Ȗ), the sign of Ȗ is negative in the coordinate of N and 
positive in the coordinate of B. This tells us that the more a society, ceteris paribus, 
makes reciprocity of G and B type costly, the more likely the prevalence of non-
cooperation becomes. 
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4. In a four-dimensional world 
 
Thus far we have compared three strategies at a time, and we have analysed their 
dynamic evolution. The question now is what changes if the four strategies N, B, G, 
C interact simultaneously.  
In the four-strategies case, the replication dynamic can be depicted by a three-
dimensional simplex.: 
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The vector tp ),,,( cwbm pppp{ , so that the system of equations becomes: 
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   Given that analysis of the system of differential equations [8] would be highly 
complex, here we only report the frontier conditions (those in which at least one 
strategy is extinct). Following the examples of Hirshleifer and Martinez Coll (1991), 
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and of Antoci, Sacco and Zarri (2004), we may represent the surface (or frontier) of 
ǻ on the plane. The simplex ǻ can be imagined as having a triangular base N,C,B, 
and G as its upper vertex (if the simplex in figure 6 were drawn three-dimensionally, 
the three vertices G would become a single upper vertex). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 shows that there are four possible equilibrium combinations: 
- a combination of G and B, i.e. cooperation 
g 
G  G B 
N C 
G 
g 
 
f 
Figure 6  
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- a combination of N and C, i.e. non-cooperation 
- the extinction of all the strategies except N 
- the extinction of all the strategies except B. 
 
4.1. Some simulations 
 
   Which of these equilibria are more likely depends on the initial conditions. To 
furnish a clearer idea of the dynamic, we now report some simulations. They have 
been obtained by setting various initial conditions for the system. We assigned the 
following values to the parameters: 
ȕ = 2, Ȗ = 1, ʌ = 4/5 
   The first graph shows the evolution over time of the strategies when the initial 
conditions state: pn = pb = pg = pc = 0.25.  
   In this case the final equilibrium is of the B-G type where the proportion of G is 
very small. What happens if we change the initial conditions? The next graph 
illustrates a situation where the initial proportions are pn = 0.25, pb = 0.25,  pg = 0.1  
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pc = 0.4. We have left the proportions of B and G unaltered, but we have increased 
Cs with respect to Gs. 
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   Interestingly, a greater proportion of Cs, although it does not improve their 
chances of ‘survival’, helps the development of Gs, which in this case remain 
constant over time. We saw in section 3.1.1 that only G types are able to activate Cs; 
we may now state that Cs are essential for the survival of Gs. The importance of the 
role performed by Cs (which in the three-strategy world seemed almost irrelevant) 
also emerges from the following graph, which has been constructed with the 
following initial proportions: pn = 0.4, pb = 0.3,  pg = 0.1  pc = 0.2.  In this case the 
Ns are initially in a greater proportion than Bs, and there are more Cs than Gs. 
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Hence, cooperation may prevail even if there are initially more Ns than Bs, provided 
that there is a sufficient number of Cs.   
 
5. Conclusions 
 
We may now draw some conclusions. We started from the hypothesis that there are 
only two strategies – N and G – and we saw, in line with the literature, that in this 
case cooperation has no chance of surviving. We also saw that in random encounters 
where the game lasts for only one round, cooperation is possible in the presence of 
three strategies (N, G, T) but only if T types have a high probability of recognizing 
the types with which they interact. But cooperation often involves repeated 
encounters between the same people, and who recognize each other. Our analysis in 
this case showed that strategy T is entirely ineffectual unless recognizability is 
presumed. Recognizability is important in civil life because it underpins the 
reputation games in which we cooperate because we recognize the others and they 
recognize us. But recognition is not always possible, especially in the great societies 
t 
p 
B 
G 
N 
C 
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of the globalized world. For this reason we extended our analysis by abandoning the 
recognizability hypothesis and advancing other reasons for the emergence of 
spontaneous (or without enforcement) cooperation. 
   We summarize our results as follows: 
(a) The ‘crucial’ role of G types. We have seen at various points in our analysis that 
G types should not be too numerous, because if they are they compromise 
themselves and also the survival, for example, of Bs. In populations where non-
cooperation is possible (which is the case of all real ones), unconditional acts are 
essential, but when too numerous, they become counter-productive. 
(b) G types perform a vital role, for only they can activate the cooperation of Cs. 
Without the presence of G types, Cs would never experience cooperation and 
therefore would never respond with an act of cooperation. G types are 
consequently valuable, but they should be protected. The success of numerous 
forms of cooperation – from firms to families – depends also, and sometimes 
above all, on the presence of a small number of unconditional reciprocators able 
to activate people who would never be so activated if they only interacted with 
conditional cooperators. 
(c) Alliances: C types. These are ‘activated’ by Gs, but at the same time their 
presence is highly beneficial to Gs because it increases their expected utility. Gs, 
in fact, cooperate with Bs and with Cs, but they are exploited by Ns. In a four-
strategy world, Cs protect the Gs against extinction. 
Cooperation is therefore favoured by heterogeneity or diversity. 
   From a mathematical point of view, it might be objected that G types are not 
necessary. The onset of cooperation would only require slightly more sophisticated 
Bs. But this was not the purpose (i.e. to study which strategies favour cooperation) 
for which the model was conceived. Our analysis started from the assumption that 
behaviours like G exist in civil society. (And who could deny the presence in the 
real world of unconditional actions? Even Binmore (2006) with his orthodoxy and 
anthropological parsimony admits their existence). Our model has sought to analysis 
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the conditions under which unconditional actions can not only survive but also 
perform a virtuous civil role.      
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Appendix 
 
Proof of proposition 1:  
The expected utilities are: 
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The matrix of payoffs is: 
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Adding a constant to each column of A does not change the dynamics, so we subtract the first row: 
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We know that::  
0!! JE  
 
 
Following  Bomze (1983), proposition 1 (p. 210)  : 
1. the eigenvalue of the corner N in direction N-G is proportional to ( J ) , then is <0 
2. the eigenvalue of the corner N in direction N-T is proportional to ( JJ r ),  then is <0 
3. the eigenvalue of the corner G in direction G-N is proportional to )(J , then is >0 
4. the eigenvalue of the corner G in direction G-T is proportional to ( JJ r ), then is >0 
5. the eigenvalue of the corner T in direction T-G is proportional to )( JJ r , then is <0 
6. the eigenvalue of the corner T in direction T-N is proportional to ( EJE rr 2 ). This value 
could be positive or negative, depending on the value of r, and then we must distinguish between 
two cases:  
First case: JE
E
 2r , eigenvalue >0 
Second case: JE
E
t 2r , eigenvalue <0. 
 
FIRST CASE 
Proposition  2 (Bomze, p. 210) shows that there aren’t any fixed point on the N-G side and on the N-
T side.  
Proposition 5 (pag. 211) shows that there aren’t any fixed point on the side G-T, and proposition 6 
shows that internal fixed points do not exist. 
 
 
SECOND CASE 
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Proposition 2 (p. 210) tells us that there exists a fixed point f on the side N-T, in fact the quantity 
)2)(( EJEJJ  rrr  is negative. The eigenvalues associated to the fixed point are proportional to Ȗ 
(positive) in direction NT, and to the quantity 
f
cdaf  , that is EJE
JJEJEEJEJ


rr
rrrr
2
))(2()2( in the other direction, then is negative. 
 
 
Proof of proposition 2:  
The expected utilities are: 
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The matrices are: 
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Following proposition 1 (p. 210)  we may say: 
1. the eigenvalue of the corner N in direction N-C is equal to 0 
2. the eigenvalue of the corner N in direction N-G is proportional to S
J


1
, and then is negative 
3. the eigenvalue of the corner C in direction C-N is equal to 0 
4. the eigenvalue of the corner C in direction C-G is proportional to S
JES


1
, then is positive (we 
have supposed that E
JS ! ) 
5. the eigenvalue of the corner G in direction G-C is proportional to S
SJJ


1
and then is positive 
6. the eigenvalue of the corner G in direction G-N is proportional to S
J
1
, and then is positive. 
 
Following proposition 2 (pag. 210) we know that N-C is pointwise fixed. 
 
Proposition 5 (p. 211) tells us that there exists a fixed point g (saddle point) on the side G-C, 
in fact the quantity (e – b)(f – c) is negative, and the eingenvalues associated to the fixed point are 
proportional to: 
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2. 
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 , that is positive. 
 
Proof of proposition 3:  
 
Expected utilities: 
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1. the eigenvalue of the corner N in direction N-C is equal to 0 
2. the eigenvalue of the corner N in direction N-B is proportional to J ,  and then is negative 
3. the eigenvalue of the corner C in direction C-N is equal to 0 
4. the eigenvalue of the corner C in direction C-G is proportional to JES  , and then is positive  
5. the eigenvalue of the corner B in direction B-C is proportional to S
JSSJJES


1
2
and then 
is negative 
6. the eigenvalue of the corner B in direction B-N is proportional to S
ESJ


1
, and then is negative 
 
Following proposition 2 (p. 210) we may say: 
- the side N-C is pointwise fixed 
- On the side N-B there exists an unique fixed point f; the eigenvalues of f are positively 
proportional to:  
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The fixed point has coordinates(Bomze 1983, pag. 204): 
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We know that do not exist fixed points on the side C-B (prop. 5) and that do not exist internal fixed 
points (prop.6). 
 
Proof of proposition 4:  
Expected utilities: 
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1. the eigenvalue of the corner N in direction N-B is proportional to J and then is negative 
2. the eigenvalue of the corner N in direction N-G is proportional to S
J
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1
 and then is negative 
3. the eigenvalue of the corner B in direction B-N is proportional to S
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1
and then is negative 
4. the eigenvalue of the corner B in direction B-G is equal to zero 
 
5. the eigenvalue of the corner G in direction G-B is equal to zero 
6. the eigenvalue of the corner G in direction G-N is equal to S
J
1
, and then is positive 
 
We know that there esists a fixed point on the side N-B (prop.2) , and that the eigenvalues of the 
fixed point are positively proportional to :  
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The fixed point has coordinates (Bomze 1983, pag. 204): 
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We also know that the side B-G is pointwise fixed. 
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